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Summary. In the spirit of Richardson’s original (1948) study of the statistics of deadly conflicts,
we study the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks worldwide over the past 38 years, and
show that these events are uniformly characterized by the phenomenon of scale invariance,
i.e., the frequency scales as an inverse power of the severity, P (x) ∝ x−α. We show that this
property is a robust feature of terrorism, existing in terrorism that targets both industrialized and
non-industrialized countries, across different weapon types and even over short time-scales.
We show that the scaling exponent fluctuates about α = 2.5, that the center of the distribution
oscillates slightly with a period of roughly τ ≈ 13 years, and that current models of event
incidence cannot account for the variation in event severity or the scale invariance property of
global terrorism. Finally, we propose a simple toy model for the generation of these statistics,
and briefly discuss its implications.
Keywords: terrorism, frequency-severity statistics, scale invariance
1. Introduction
Richardson first introduced the concept of scale invariance, i.e., a power-law scaling between
dependent and independent variables, to the study of conflict by examining the frequency
versus severity statistics of large and small conflicts (Richardson, 1948). His work demon-
strated that for both wars and small-scale homicides, the frequency of an event scales as an
inverse power of the event’s severity (in this case, the number of casualties). Richardson,
and subsequent researchers, found that the frequency of wars of a size x scale as P (x) ∝ x−α,
where α ≈ 2 and is called the scaling exponent. Recently, power-law statistics have been
found to characterize a wide variety of phenomena include natural disasters such as earth-
quakes, floods and forest fires (Bak and Tang, 1989; Turcotte et al., 1998; Newman, 2005),
the distribution of city sizes, the number of citations for scientific papers and the frequency
of words in language (Zipf, 1949; Simon, 1955; Newman, 2005), among others. As a re-
flection of their apparent ubiquity, it has even been said, somewhat pejoratively, that such
extremal statistics are “more normal than normal” (Lun et al., 2005). What distinguishes
the power law distribution from the normal distribution is its heavy tail, i.e., there is a
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non-trivial amount of weight far from the center of the distribution. This in turn implies
that events orders of magnitude larger (or smaller) than the mean are relatively common;
the power-law distribution is one particular kind of heavy-tailed distribution and is most
commonly identified by a straight line with slope α on doubly-logarithmic axes. We refer
to Newman (2005) for more details on power laws, their properties and their measurement.
Here, we extend Richardson’s program of study to the most topical kind of conflict:
terrorism. Specifically, we empirically study the distributional nature of the frequency
and severity of terrorist events worldwide since 1968. Although terrorism as a political
tool has a long history (Congleton, 2002), it is only in the modern era that small groups
of so-motivated individuals have had access to extremely destructive weapons (FBI, 1999;
Shubik, 1997). Access to such weapons has resulted in severe terrorist events such as the
20 March 1995 release of the Sarin nerve agent in a Tokyo subway which injured or killed
over 5000, the 7 August 1998 car bombing in Nairobi, Kenya which injured or killed over
5200, or the more well known attack on 11 September 2001 in New York City which killed
2749. Conventional wisdom holds that these rare-but-severe events are outliers, i.e., they
are qualitatively different from the more common smaller terrorist attacks that kill or injure
only a few people. Although that impression may be true from an operational standpoint,
it is false from a statistical standpoint. The frequency-severity statistics of terrorist events
are scale invariant and, consequently, there is no fundamental difference between small and
large events; both are consistent with a single underlying distribution. This in turn suggests
that there is no reason to expect that “major” or more severe terrorist attacks should require
qualitatively different explanations than less salient forms of terrorism.
Just as research on conflict has tended to study war as a dichotomous event rather
than examine their magnitude or severity of violence (Cederman, 2003; Lacina, 2006), the
traditional approach to empirical research on terrorism has focused on incidence of terror-
ist events, without distinguishing their severity or lethality. Recently, however, two of the
authors of this report demonstrated for the first time that the relationship between the
frequency and severity of terrorist events exhibits the surprising and robust feature of scale
invariance (Clauset and Young, 2005). In an important study, Johnson et al. (2005, 2006)
subsequently considered the frequency and severity of fatal attacks or clashes in guerilla war-
fare environments such as the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Colombia. They suggest that
the time-varying behavior of the distributions in those two conflicts are trending toward
a common power law with scaling exponent α = 2.5 – a value they note as being similar
to the one reported by Clauset and Young (2005) for terrorist events in economically un-
derdeveloped nations. They then propose a mathematical model of such guerilla conflicts
that produces this scaling exponent, and conjecture that, as a result, the conflicts of Iraq,
Colombia, Afghanistan, Casamance (Senegal), Indonesia, Israel, Northern Ireland and ter-
rorism are converging to a universal distribution with this value of α (Johnson et al., 2006).
Another important deviation from the traditional approach to the study of terrorism is
the work of Bogen and Jones (2006), who focus primarily on aggregate figures in assessing
whether there is an increase in the severity of terrorism over time and forecasting mortality
due to terrorism.
These lines of inquiry point to many new questions in the study of terrorism. An
adequate model of terrorism should not only give us indications of where or when terrorist
events are likely to occur, but also generate other significant statistical patterns, such as
the observed frequency distribution of events and their severity. Later in this paper we will
examine to what extent models proposed to account for the location of terrorist incidents
can also account for differences in their severity. We first start with a brief overview of data
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Table 1. A summary of the distributions shown in Figure 1, with power-law fits from
the maximum likelihood method. N (Ntail) depicts the number of events in the full (tail)
distribution. The parenthetical value depicts the standard error of the last digit of the
estimated scaling exponent.
Distribution N x¯ σstd xmax Ntail α xmin pKS ≥
Injuries 6047 14.04 104.60 5000 464 2.47(7) 35 0.467
Deaths 7189 4.69 35.49 2749 377 2.36(7) 14 0.999
Total 8438 13.31 106.20 5291 423 2.39(7) 47 0.939
on terrorism, and examine the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks.
2. Data sources for terrorist events
Many organizations track terrorist events worldwide, but few provide their data in a form
amenable to scientific analysis. The most popular source of information on terrorist events
in the political science literature is the ITERATE data set (Mickolus et al., 2004), which
focuses exclusively on transnational terrorist events involving actors from at least two coun-
tries. In principle, however, at least from the standpoint of frequency and severity statis-
tics, we see no reason to restrict our analysis to transnational events. Instead, we use the
data contained in the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)
database (MIPT, 2006), which largely overlaps with the ITERATE data, but includes fully
domestic terrorist events, as well. We note, however, that our analyses are easily be applied
to the portion of the ITERATE data that reports event severity; doing so yields evidence
similar to that which we present here. Thus, without loss of generality and except where
noted, we will focus exclusively on the MIPT data for the remainder of the paper. The
MIPT database is itself the compilation of the RAND Terrorism Chronology 1968-1997,
the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-Present), the Terrorism Indictment
database (University of Arkansas & University of Oklahoma), and DFI International’s re-
search on terrorist organizations.
At the end of 2005, the MIPT database contained records for over 24 602 terrorist events
in more than 4500 cities across 187 countries worldwide between 1968 and 2005. Although
alternative definitions for terrorism exist, the MIPT database uses a relatively standard one
that may be summarized as any violent act intended to create fear for political purposes.
Each entry in the database is quite narrow: it is an attack on a single target in a single
location (city) on a single day. For example, the Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on
11 September 2001 appear as three events in the database, one for each of the locations:
New York City, Washington D.C. and Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Each record includes the
date, target, city (if applicable), country, type of weapon used, terrorist group responsible
(if known), number of deaths (if known), number of injuries (if known), a brief description
of the attack and the source of the information.
Of the nearly twenty-five thousand recorded events, 8 438 of them resulted in at least one
person being injured or killed, and we restrict our analyses to these events as they appear to
be the least susceptible to any reporting bias. Further, it is reasonable to assume that large
events, as a result of their severity both in terms of casualties and political repercussions,
will have more reliable severity estimates. However, we also note that a proportionally small
under- or over-estimate of the severity of any event will have only a small effect the results
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Fig. 1. The frequency-severity distributions P (X ≥ x) of attacks worldwide between 1968 and
2005 by injuries, deaths and their sum. The solid line indicates the power-law scaling found by the
maximum likelihood method. Details of fits for these distributions are given in Table 1.
of our statistical analysis and will not change the core result of scale invariance. As with
Richardson’s study of the severity of wars, simply obtaining the correct order of magnitude
of an event reveals much of the basic scaling behavior. Throughout the remainder of the
paper, we will define the severity of an event to be either the number of injuries, the number
of deaths, or their sum, where the severity is always greater than zero. Unless otherwise
noted, we focus exclusively on the statistics of these values.
3. Frequency-severity distributions for attacks since 1968
Collecting all events since 1968 as a histogram of severity, we show their cumulative dis-
tribution functions P (X ≥ x) in Figure 1. The regular scaling in the upper tails of these
distributions immediately demonstrates that events orders of magnitude larger than the
average event size are not outliers, but are instead in concordance with a global pattern
in the frequency statistics of terrorist attacks. Significantly, the scaling exists despite large
structural and political changes in the international system such as the fall of communism,
the type of weapon used, recent technological developments, the demise of individual terror-
ist organizations and the geographic distribution of events. In subsequent sections, we will
examine the robustness of the scale invariance to both categorical and temporal analysis.
If we make the idealization that events are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), we may model the distribution as a power law with some exponent α. Obviously, sig-
nificant correlations between many events exist, but for the sake of a parsimonious model, we
ignore that fact for the moment. Using the method of maximum likelihood (Newman, 2005),
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we use the data to estimate the scaling exponent α and the lower-limit of the scaling be-
havior xmin. Models found in this way are summarized in Table 1. Statistically, we find
by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that these i.i.d. models are surprisingly good for
representing the death and total severity distributions (pKS > 0.99 and pKS > 0.9, respec-
tively), and that there is insufficient evidence to reject it as a model of the injury-severity
distribution at the 0.05 level.1
In Section 7, we will see that the quality of the total severity model improves when we
decompose it into component distributions, each of which is strongly scale invariant, but
with different scaling and limit parameters. As mentioned earlier, the power law is not the
only distribution with a heavy tail, and although testing all such alternatives is beyond
the scope of this paper, we tested another common distribution, the log-normal (see, for
instance, Serfling (2002)), and found in all cases that we may reject this model (pKS < 0.05).
4. Evolution of terrorism over time
Because events in the database are annotated with their incidence date, we may order them
so as to produce a time-series by which to investigate properties of the severity distribution
as a function of time.2 Although our ultimate interest is in the property of scale invariance
over time, we will first consider a more simple measure of the distribution’s shape, the
average log-severity. Sliding a window 24 months wide over the 38 years of event data,
we compute the average log-severity (deaths) of events within each window. For highly
skewed distributions, such as those we show in Figure 1, the average log-severity measures
the position on the independent axis of the distribution’s center in a way that reduces its
sensitivity to the variations, from the occasional presence of rare-but-severe events, in the
range of the upper tail. The resulting time series of this measure is shown in the upper-pane
of Figure 2, with standard error bounds. Notably, this function is largely stable over the
38 years of data in the MIPT database, illustrating that the center of the distribution has
not varied substantially over that time. A close examination of the fluctuations, however,
suggests the presence of potential periodic variation. We investigate this possibility by
taking the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the time series, which is shown in the lower-
pane. The noticeable sinusoidal shape in the ACF shows that the fluctuations do exhibit a
strong degree of periodicity on the order of τ ≈ 13 years. Notably, the size of the sliding
window does not substantially effect either the magnitude of the auto-correlation or its
periodicity, and we have examined results for windows of 12 to 60 or more months (data
not shown). Thus, we conjecture that this periodicity is, in fact, a natural feature of global
terrorism, although we have no explanation for its origin.
1The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test evaluates whether observed data seem to be a plausible random
i.i.d. sample from a given probability distribution by comparing the maximum difference between
the observed and the expected cumulative distributions.
2In 1998, the management of the database was transferred from the RAND Corp. to the MIPT,
which resulted in several observable differences in record entries in the database. For instance, the
number of entries dramatically increased immediately afterward (see the bottom-pane of Figure 3b),
suggesting that the true number of events in the database for some period directly prior to 1998
is greater than we observe in the database. Although this biasing event could create problems for
analyses that count incidents, it does not effect the scale invariant shape of the frequency-severity
distribution, primarily, we believe, because the large events in the tail of the distribution were the
least susceptible to any under-reporting bias.
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Fig. 2. (upper) The average log-severity (deaths) of events within a sliding window of 24 months,
for the entire 38 years of data. The dashed line indicates one standard deviation. (lower) The
autocorrelation function of the average log-severity, illustrating a strong periodicity in the breadth of
the distribution at roughly τ ≈ 13 years.
5. Scale invariance over time
Turning now to the question of scale invariance, we use a similar sliding-window method-
ology to partition events into discrete groups. Here, we take a window of 60 months to
ensure the presence of enough data to reasonably estimate the power-law parameters under
our methodology. The time dependence of the power-law exponent α for the conflicts of
Colombia and Iraq was first discussed by Johnson et al. (2005). We expand upon this idea
and fit both parameters of our model to the time-varying data, plotting the resulting time-
series of scaling exponents for the frequency-severity (deaths) distribution in Figure 3a. To
avoid problems related to statistical artifacts, we omit data points that are not statistically
significant with respect to our power-law model; the dashed lines indicate standard error
bounds, and the solid line illustrates the slight linear trend in the inferred parameter time-
series. The corresponding statistical significance measures are shown in the upper-pane
of Figure 3b, the inferred values of xmin in the middle-pane, and the average inter-event
interval, i.e., the average delay between events worldwide, is shown in the lower-pane.
The fluctuations in the vicinity of the value α = 2.5 agree with the conclusions we draw
from the average log-severity time-series (Fig. 2) in the previous section, i.e., the general
shape of the distribution of the severity of terrorist events has not changed substantially over
the past 38 years. Under the idealized assumption that events are drawn i.i.d. from a power-
law distribution, the emergence of extremely severe events in recent years can be attributed
to the continual rise in the frequency of attacks. The lower-pane of Figure 3b illustrates that
the average number of events (or here, its reciprocal, the mean inter-event interval) per unit
Scale Invariance in the Severity of Terrorism 7

















































Fig. 3. Statistics of event severity (deaths) over a sliding window of 60 months. (a) Maximum
likelihood exponent α as a function of time, subset to statistically significant values (pKS > 0.9). The
black line indicates the linear trend with slope m = −5.8 × 10−3 units per year. (b) Three panes
showing aspects of the function α(t); (top) significance values computed from a one-sided KS test,
(middle) the estimated xmin values, and (bottom) the average inter-event interval.
time has been steadily increasing. In heavy-tailed distributions, this implies a progressively
deeper exploration of the tail of the distribution, i.e., the incidence of progressively more
severe events. Although the assumption of i.i.d. is clearly an idealization, it is surprising
how well it captures the dynamics and properties of the severity distribution.
One might seek to explain the increase in the frequency of events, a fact that is consistent
with the most recent report on global trends in terrorism by the United States Department
of State (2004), by normalizing the incidence rate to the world population. For example, the
inter-event interval falls from ∆t ≈ 168 hours, for the period 1975 – 1979, to ∆t ≈ 9 hours
for 2001 – 2005. Between these periods, the world’s population only doubled (roughly),
while the frequency of terrorist events increased almost twenty-fold. This suggests that the
true change in the nature of global terrorism over the recent past is not in the frequency-
severity distribution, which has remained stable for decades, but rather in the frequency
with which events are drawn from that distribution.
6. Variation in scale invariance by target-country industrialization
Let us now examine the impact of industrialization on the frequency-severity distribution
of terrorist events worldwide – given that each attack is executed within a specific country,
we may ask whether there is a significant difference in the scaling behaviors of events within
industrialized and non-industrialized countries. We divide the events since 1968 into those
that occurred within the 30 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) nations (1282 events, or 18%), and those that occurred throughout the rest of
the world (5806 events, or 82%). We plot the corresponding total severity distributions in
Figure 4a (also summarized in Table 2).
Most notably, we find substantial differences in the scaling of the two distributions, where
industrialized-nation events scale as αOECD = 2.06(9) while non-industrialized-nation events
8 Clauset, Young and Gleditsch


















































Fig. 4. (a) The frequency-severity (total) distributions P (X ≥ x) of attacks worldwide between 1968
and 2005, divided among nations inside and outside of the OECD. (b) Total-severity distributions
for six weapon types: chemical or biological agents (0.2% of events), explosives (45.4%, includes
remotely detonated devices), fire (1.4%), firearms (39.8%), knives (2.6%) and other (10.6%; includes
unconventional and unknown weapon types). For both figures, solid lines indicate the fits, described
in Table 2, found by the maximum likelihood method.
scale more steeply, as αnon−OECD = 2.46(7). The moral here is that while events have, to
date, been less likely to occur within the major industrialized nations, when they do, they
tend to be more severe than their non-industrialized counterparts. Although this distinction
is plausibly the result of technological differences, i.e., industrialization itself makes possible
more severe events, it may also arise because industrialized nations are targeted by more
severe attacks for political reasons. We leave the exploration of such questions for the future.
7. Variation in scale invariance by weapon type
As our last characterization of the scale-invariant frequency-severity distribution, we con-
sider the connection between technology, represented by the type of weapon used in an
attack, and the severity of the event. Figure 4b shows the total severity distributions
for chemical or biological weapons, explosives (including remotely detonated devices), fire,
firearms, knives and a catch-all category “other” (which also includes unconventional3 and
unknown weapons). We find that these component distributions themselves exhibit scale
invariance, each with a unique exponent α and lower limit of the power-law scaling xmin.
However, for the explosives and chemical or biological weapons distributions, we must make
a few caveats. In the latter case, the sparsity of data reduces the power of our statistical
tests, while for the former, there is clearly another phenomenon at play in the lower tail.
We summarize these distributions and their power law models in Table 2.
Through this partitioning of events, we can now see that the origin of the bending in
the lower tail of the injuries distribution (Fig. 1a) is from explosive attacks , i.e., there
is something special about attacks utilizing explosives that makes them significantly more
3 The attacks of 11 September 2001 are considered unconventional.
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Table 2. A summary of the distributions shown in Figure 4, with power-law fits from the
maximum likelihood method. N (Ntail) depicts the number of events in the full (tail) distri-
bution. The parenthetical value depicts the standard error of the last digit of the estimated
scaling exponent.
Distribution N x¯ σstd xmax Ntail α xmin pKS ≥
OECD 1206 17.97 209.49 5012 143 2.06(9) 14 0.827
Non-OECD 7232 12.53 76.43 5291 383 2.46(7) 47 0.752
Chem/Bio 19 272.58 1147.84 5012 19 1.7(3) 1 0.893
Explosives 3831 21.02 102.42 5291 362 2.49(7) 49 0.685
Fire 114 19.24 115.61 1200 77 2.0(1) 2 0.956
Firearms 3356 4.42 28.57 1058 314 2.35(8) 7 0.997
Knives 220 2.41 7.47 107 220 2.3(3) 1 0.999
Other 898 10.10 167.58 5010 139 2.2(1) 6 0.975
likely to injure small or moderate numbers of people than one would expect from the
power-law model. However, this property fails for larger events and the scaling resumes
in the upper tail. In contrast, we see no such change in the scaling behavior in the lower
tail for other weapons – this demonstrates that the property of scale invariance is largely
independent of the choice of weapon. Further, by partitioning events according to their
weapon type, we typically recover high estimates of statistical significance (pKS > 0.95).
8. A regression model for the severity of terrorist events
There is an extensive literature on what factors promote terrorism and make governments
more likely to become targets of terrorism. We refer to Pape (2003), Reich (1990), and
Rosendorff and Sandler (2005) for overviews of existing studies of terrorism. Notably,
however, existing studies say nothing about the severity-frequency distribution of events,
and empirical research on terrorism has tended to focus predicting terrorist incidence. In this
section, we consider to what extent models proposed to predict the incidence of terrorism
data can account for the severity of terrorism, and reproduce the observed frequency-severity
distribution.
As an example of empirical studies on the frequency of terrorist incidents, we use a
recent study by Li (2005). He explores empirically the impact of a large number of political
and economic factors hypothesized to make transnational terrorist incidents more or less
likely. In particular, he argues that while some features of democratic institutions such as
greater executive constraints tend to make terrorist incidents more likely, other features
such as democratic participation are associated with fewer incidents. Model (1) in Table 3
displays the coefficient estimates for Li’s original results from a negative binomial regression
of the number of transnational terrorist, with each country-year as the unit of observation.
We refer to the original Li (2005) article for all details on variable construction, etc.
Since our data are based on terrorist incidents that are not limited to transnational
events,4 we first replicate the Li model for incidents in the MIPT data to ensure that
our results are not an artifact of systematic differences between transnational and domestic
terrorist events. The coefficient estimates for the Li model applied to the number of incidents
4Recall, however, that our analysis of the ITERATE data shows that transnational terrorism
also exhibits scale invariance.
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Table 3. Coefficients for a negative binomial regression model on terrorist event incidence,
after Li (2005), and its ability to predict observed severity statistics; parenthetical entries
give robust standard errors.










Govt constraint 0.061 0.102 -0.013 0.046
(0.023) (0.030) (0.013) (0.038)
Democratic participation -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 -0.011
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
Income inequality 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002
(0.014) (0.016) (0.007) (0.021)
GDP per capita -0.177 -0.161 0.008 -0.222
(0.11) (0.14) (0.047) (0.15)
Regime durability -0.076 -0.109 0.039 0.010
(0.047) (0.060) (0.024) (0.067)
Size 0.118 0.0494 -0.014 -0.001
(0.044) (0.054) (0.015) (0.079)
Govt capability 0.275 0.189 -0.018 0.072
(0.14) (0.18) (0.061) (0.21)
Past incident 0.547 0.717 -0.009 0.789
(0.045) (0.052) (0.024) (0.081)
Post-cold war -0.578 -0.253 0.104 -0.036
(0.097) (0.11) (0.061) (0.16)
Conflict -0.170 -0.046 0.294 0.072
(0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.39)
Europe 0.221 -0.263 -0.133 -0.589
(0.20) (0.34) (0.075) (0.49)
Asia -0.494 -0.684 0.239 -0.542
(0.25) (0.28) (0.13) (0.36)
America -0.349 -0.681 -0.098 -1.125
(0.15) (0.23) (0.073) (0.30)
Africa -0.423 -0.462 0.022 -0.538
(0.18) (0.21) (0.12) (0.31)
Constant -0.443 0.805 1.591 2.548
(1.54) (1.89) (0.65) (2.63)
N 2232 2232 1109 2232
Log-likelihood -3805.791 -3300.011 -2897.375 -2268.129
LR-χ2 1151.842 507.427 151.709 373.293
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in the MIPT data shown as Model (2) in Table 3 are generally reasonably similar to the
results for original model, suggesting that the model behaves similarly when applied to the
two sources of data on terrorism.
Next, we examine to what extent the right-hand side covariates in the Li model allows
us to predict to differences in the severity of terrorism. Model (3) in Table 3 displays
the results for a negative binomial regression of the number of deaths among the lethal
events in the MIPT data. Comparing the size of the coefficient estimates to their standard
errors suggest that none of these coefficients are distinguishable from 0, with the possible
exception of the estimate for Europe and the post-cold war period. In other words, none
of the factors proposed by Li seem to be good predictors of the severity of terrorist events.
Moreover, the proposed Li model fails to generate predictions that in any way resemble
the observed variation in the number of deaths: the largest predicted number of deaths
for any observation in the observed sample is less than 10, far below the actual observed
maximum of 2749 (i.e., the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center). The
original Li model examines the number of incidents by country-year, and it may therefore be
argued that looking only at events with casualties could understate the possible success of
the model in identifying countries that are unlikely to become targets of terrorist incidents.
The results for the Li model applied to the total events for all country-years, Model (4) in
Table 3, however, do not lend much support to this. Very few of the features emphasized by
Li have coefficient estimates distinguishable from 0 by conventional significance criteria, and
the highest predicted number of deaths for any one country-year in the sample is still less
than 16. As such, this model is clearly not able to generate the upper tail of the observed
severity distribution.
9. A toy model for scale invariance through competitive forces
As we have seen in the previous section, a standard regression model for event incidence is a
poor predictor of event severity, and it fails to reproduce the observed scale invariance in the
tail of the frequency-severity statistics. Thus, it is reasonable to turn to alternative models
to explain this robust statistical feature. Power laws themselves can arise from a wide vari-
ety of processes (Newman, 2005; Mitzenmacher, 2004; Farmer and Geanakoplos, 2005). For
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, forest fires and wars, the model of self-organized criti-
cality (SOC) (Bak et al., 1987), a physics model for equilibrium critical phenomena5 in spa-
tially extended systems, appears to be the most reasonable explanation (Bak and Tang, 1989;
Turcotte et al., 1998; Cederman, 2003) as events themselves are spatial. However, such
models seem ill-suited for terrorism, in which the severity of an event is not directly related
to its spatial extent.
One trivial model for the frequency-severity scale invariance would be a tight connection
with size of the targeted city and the number of casualties. That is, because city populations
are distributed as a power law, we may suppose that an event’s severity is proportional
to the size of the target city. If target cities are chosen roughly uniformly at random,
an obviously unrealistic idealization, then a power law in the frequency-severity statistics
follows naturally. Tabulating population estimates for cities in our database from publicly
available census data, we find that the correlation between an event’s severity and the
5Critical phenomena characterize a phase transition such as the evaporation of water, while an
equilibrium critical phenomenon is one in which the critical state is a global attractor of system
dynamics.
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target city population is very weak, r = 0.2(2) for deaths and r = 0.2(1) for total severity,
where the number in parentheses is the standard error from a bootstrap resampling of the
correlation calculation. A regression model on other characteristics of the target cities may
yield better results.
In the context of guerilla conflicts, Johnson et al. (2005, 2006) have proposed a dy-
namic equilibrium model that produces exponents in the range of 1.5 to 3.5 depending on
a parameter that is related to the rates of fragmentation and coalescence of the insurgent
groups; they conjecture that the value 2.5 is universal for asymmetric conflict. As an al-
ternative explanation to the origin of the scale invariance that we observe in terrorism, we
propose and analyze a simple, non-spatially extended toy model of a competitive process
between states and non-state actors. This process produces exponents that vary depending
on the model parameters, as can be the case when the statistics are controlled for economic
development or weapon type. Thus these parameters could be fitted to explain the varying
exponents we see for different weapon types or the degree of economic development.
Consider a non-state actor (i.e., a terrorist) who is planning an attack. Intuitively, the
more severe an event is to be, the more planning it will require. Reversing this relationship,
we say that the size of the planned event grows with time, up to some finite limit imposed
perhaps by the choice of weapon (as suggested by Fig. 4), the choice of target, or the
available resources. If we further assume that the rate at which additional planning pays
off is proportional to the amount of time already invested, i.e., increasing the severity of a
well-planned event is easier than for a more ad hoc event, then the severity of a planned
event will be p(t) ∝ eκt, where κ > 0 is a constant. However, many planned events are
prevented from becoming a reality for a variety of reasons. To model this selection process,
we say that the probability that a planned event will be executed is exponentially related
to its size, ie., the larger the event, the more chance such an effort will be abandoned,
executed before planning is complete, the actor incarcerated by the state, or that the effort
will simply fail. Thus, we may say that the severity of a real event is related by x ∝ eλt,
where λ < 0 is a constant. To derive the distribution of events that actually occur, we must




a transformation of variables between the potential severity distribution and the actual
severity distribution. Doing so yields p(x) ∝ x−α where α = 1 − κ/λ. It may be plausible
that both state and actors will, through a process much like co-evolution of parasites and
hosts, develop roughly equal capabilities, but perhaps with a slight advantage toward the
state by virtue of its longevity relative to terrorist organizations, such that |κ| & |λ|. In
this case, we have a power law with exponent α & 2, in approximate agreement with our
empirical data.
Naturally, the geopolitical and cultural factors relevant to a specific terrorist attack are
extremely complex, and our toy model intentionally omits them. Presumably, these factors
would influence the values assumed by the parameters of our model, and are essential for
explaining the variety of scaling exponents we observe in the data, e.g., the different scaling
exponents for OECD and non-OECD nations and for attacks perpetrated using different
weapons. The development of more realistic models, perhaps by incorporating tools from
evolutionary game theory, is a topic that we propose for the future.
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10. Discussion and conclusions
Many of the traditional analyses of trends in terrorism are comparative, descriptive, his-
torical or institutional, and those that are statistical rely on assumptions of normality and
thus treat rare-but-severe events as qualitatively different from less severe but common
events (Reich, 1990; FBI, 1999; Dept. of State, 2004; Rosendorff and Sandler, 2005). We
show that these assumptions are fundamentally false, by demonstrating that Richardson’s
discovery of scale invariance in the frequency-severity statistics of wars extends to the same
statistics for terrorism. Notably, however, the estimates of the scaling behavior for wars
differs substantially from that which we observe for terrorism, i.e., the frequency-severity of
wars scales very slowly, with αwar = 1.80(9) while the distribution scales much more steeply
for terrorism, αdeaths = 2.36(7).
Taking Richardson’s program of study on the statistics of deadly human conflicts in con-
junction with the results given here, our previous study of terrorism (Clauset and Young, 2005)
and the Johnson et al. study of insurgent conflicts (Johnson et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2006),
we may now make the conjecture that not only is scale invariance a generic feature of the
severity distribution of deadly human conflicts, but it is the differences in the type of conflict
that determine the particular scaling behavior, i.e., the values of the scaling exponent α and
the lower-limit of the scaling xmin. Indeed, this variation is precisely what we observe when
we control for attributes like the degree of economic development, and the type of weapon
used in the attack. A significant open question for future work remains to determine how
and why the distinguishing attributes of a conflict, such as the degree of asymmetry, the
length of campaign and the political agenda, affect the observed scaling behavior.
The strength of our scale invariance results for terrorism prompts us to consider whether
existing traditional studies of terrorism can account for this empirical feature. These studies
have suggested many useful models of the strategic behavior underlying resort to terror-
ism, as well as the likely effectiveness of specific forms of government interventions, in
particular with respect to possible substitution effects, where terrorist may resort to alter-
native targets and techniques as particular targets become relatively more difficult to at-
tack (Enders and Sandler, 2006). However, despite Richardson’s (1948) evidence for scale
invariance in the severity of war, researchers have ignored the same phenomenon in the
severity of terrorist events. From a policy perspective, this and the other empirical reg-
ularities we describe will be helpful in both forecasting the severity distribution of future
terrorist attacks, forecasting trends in the severity of global terrorism, and in contingency
planning, since most efforts to thwart terrorist violence or address its origins are unlikely
to completely eradicate all incidences of terrorism, at least in the short run. Further, an
accounting of the severity of events, in addition to other aspects such as the target, strategy
and weapon type, will benefit policy makers in deciding how to allocate resources for the
prevention of terrorism.
At a more fundamental level, adequate models to understand and explain terrorism must
be able to generate the observed frequency-severity distribution, as do both the toy model we
present here and the model proposed by Johnson et al. (2005, 2006), but also match other
important statistical regularities in terrorism. These models offer several interesting avenues
of future inquiry and validation, but we encourage the community to continue to consider
alternative microscopic mechanisms that may give rise to the observed statistical patterns.
We hope that the results we describe herein have sufficiently highlighted the importance
of accounting for the robust empirical patterns we have observed in the distribution of the
severity of terrorist events, and that is serves to motivate further investigations in the area.
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Appendix A: Statistical methodology
Since Richardson first considered the scale invariance in the frequency and severity of wars,
statistical methods for characterizing power laws have advanced significantly. The signature
feature of a tail distribution that decays as a power law is a straight-line with slope α on
doubly logarithmic axes. As such, a popular method of measuring the scaling exponent α
has been least-squares regression on log-transformed data, i.e., one takes the log of both the
dependent and independent variables and measures the slope using a least-squares linear fit.
Unfortunately, this estimator for the scaling exponent is known to yield biased estimates of
the scaling exponent (Goldstein et al., 2004). An unbiased estimator can be derived using
the method of maximum likelihood (Newman, 2005), and is given as









where xmin denotes the lowest value for which the scaling holds, i.e., it denotes the beginning
of the tail distribution and n is the number of observations in the tail. Typically, xmin is
estimated visually, and, when the data span many orders of magnitude, a conservative
estimate of xmin is sufficient. For the terrorist events, the severity data only spans a few
orders of magnitude and a conservative estimate would result in an underpopulated tail.
This would, in turn, give our tests little statistical power. To ameliorate this problem,
we use a numerical method for selecting the xmin that yields the best power-law model
for the data. Specifically, for each xmin over some reasonable range, we first calculate the
maximum likelihood exponent αML on the data X ≥ xmin, and measure the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) goodness-of-fit statistic when comparing the data being fit and a theoretical
power-law distribution with parameters αML and xmin. We then select the xmin that yields
the best fit to our data under this test. For simulated data with similar characteristics to
the MIPT data, we find that this method correctly estimates both the lower bound on the






∣∣∣Fn(x;α, y) − Fˆn(x; y)∣∣∣] ,
where F (x; y, α) is the theoretical cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the power law
with parameters α and xmin = y, and Fˆn(x; y) is the empirical distribution function (edf)
for the n observed data points greater than y.
Once the parameters for the power law have been estimated, we then measure the
standard error in α via bootstrap. The errors reported in Tables 1 and 2 for α are derived
in this manner. The statistical significance value is derived by a Monte Carlo simulation
of data drawn from Fn(x;α, xmin), where α and xmin have been estimated as above, under
the one-sided KS test. Tabulating the results of the simulation yields an appropriate table
of p-values for the fit.
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As mentioned in the text, there are many heavy-tailed distributions, e.g., the q-exponential
e−αxq , the stretched exponential e
−αxβ , the log-normal, and even a different two-parameter
power law (c + x)−α. For data that span only a few orders of magnitude, the behavior of
these functions can be statistically indistinguishable. As such, we cannot rule out all Type
II statistical errors for our power law models; however, we note that for the distributions
described in Section 3, the statistical power test versus a log-normal model indicates that
the power law better represents the empirical data.
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